Informal Taxation by Singhal, Monica & Olken, Benjamin A.
 
Informal Taxation
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Olken, Benjamin A., and Monica Singhal. 2009. Informal
Taxation. HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP09-
033, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
Published Version http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.as
px?PubId=6852
Accessed February 18, 2015 8:09:33 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4449108
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Informal Taxation 
 
 
 
Benjamin A. Olken 
Department of Economics – MIT 
 
 
Monica Singhal  
John F. Kennedy School of Government – Harvard University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty Research Working Papers Series 
 
 
October 2009 
RWP09-033 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in the HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the John F. Kennedy School of Government or of Harvard University.  Faculty Research 
Working Papers have not undergone formal review and approval.  Such papers are included in this series to elicit 
feedback and to encourage debate on important public policy challenges. Copyright belongs to the author(s).   
Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
INFORMAL TAXATION
Benjamin A. Olken
Monica Singhal
Working Paper 15221
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15221
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
August 2009
We thank Tim Besley, Ryan Bubb, Steve Coate, Amy Finkelstein, Ed Glaeser, Roger Gordon, Seema
Jayachandran, Henrik Kleven, Wojciech Kopczuk, Stephan Litschig, Erzo Luttmer, Rohini Pande,
Jim Poterba, and numerous seminar participants for comments. We thank Angelin Baskaran, Octavia
Foarta, Angela Kilby, Arash Nekoei, and Yusuf Neggers for excellent research assistance. We gratefully
acknowledge funding from the Harvard University Asia Center (Olken and Singhal), NICHD grant
R03HD051957 (Olken), and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Taubman Center
for State and Local Government (Singhal). We thank Rob Chase and Diane Steele at the World Bank
for providing us with data. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the World Bank, the National Bureau of Economic Research, or any other institution.
© 2009 by Benjamin A. Olken and Monica Singhal. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Informal Taxation
Benjamin A. Olken and Monica Singhal
NBER Working Paper No. 15221
August 2009
JEL No. H27,H41,O17
ABSTRACT
Informal payments are a frequently overlooked source of local public finance in developing countries.
We use microdata from ten countries to establish stylized facts on the magnitude, form, and distributional
implications of this "informal taxation." Informal taxation is widespread, particularly in rural areas,
with substantial in-kind labor payments. The wealthy pay more, but pay less in percentage terms, and
informal taxes are more regressive than formal taxes.  Failing to include informal taxation underestimates
household tax burdens and revenue decentralization in developing countries. We propose a simple
model of information and enforcement constraints that parsimoniously explains the patterns in the
data.
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A key function of government is the ￿nance and provision of local public goods. Taxation allows
communities to overcome the free rider problem that would otherwise lead to underprovision of these
goods. In many developing countries, formal direct taxation of households is limited, comprising
only 18% of total tax revenues on average compared with 45% in developed countries (Gordon
and Li 2005).1 Agricultural sectors are often entirely exempt from taxation, and local taxation
is generally quite constrained (Burgess and Stern 1993, Bird 1990). These facts would suggest
that local public goods are primarily ￿nanced outside the local community, either through direct
provision or intergovernmental grants.
Substantial anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that local residents in many communities
throughout the developing world do contribute substantially ￿outside the formal tax system ￿to
the construction and maintenance of local public goods (e.g., Ostrom 1991). People pay in both
money and labor to these projects, with often complex arrangements determining how much each
household should pay and what penalties apply for those who free ride. Many countries even have
speci￿c vocabulary to describe these systems, such as gotong royong in Indonesia and harambee in
Kenya.
We refer to these mechanisms of ￿nancing of local public goods as ￿informal taxation.￿ We
de￿ne informal taxation as a system of local public goods ￿nance coordinated by public o¢ cials but
enforced socially rather than through the formal legal system.2 Our distinction between formal and
informal (legal versus social enforcement) parallels the use of these terms in the informal insurance
literature (e.g. Townsend 1994). The involvement of public o¢ cials, discussed in more detail below,
distinguishes informal taxation from, for example, provision of local public goods by charities or
other non-governmental organizations.
In this paper, we develop some of the ￿rst systematic micro-evidence on the magnitude, distrib-
utional implications, and forms of informal taxation, using a micro dataset we assembled consisting
1These ￿gures refer to personal income taxation and are calculated from Table 1 of Gordon and Li 2005.
2This is not to be confused with bribe payments, which are occasionally also referred to as informal taxation.
To the best of our knowledge, the system of ￿nancing local public goods through these types of payments was ￿rst
described as informal taxation by Prud￿ homme 1992, who, in his study of local public goods provision in Zaire, de￿ned
informal taxation to include any "nonformal means utilized to ￿nance the provision of public goods and services."
1of survey data from ten developing countries throughout the world. We then develop a simple
framework for thinking about informal taxation that, with very few assumptions, matches the styl-
ized facts we observe in the data. In the concluding section of the paper, we discuss the broader
implications of our ￿ndings for public ￿nance and policy in developing countries.
The ￿rst stylized fact we document is that informal taxation is a widespread phenomenon,
and it can form a substantial share of local revenue. The share of households making informal
tax payments is 20% or higher in all but one country in our sample and exceeds 50% in several
countries. Participation rates are always higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Across our
sampled countries, informal taxes generally comprise a small share of household expenditure (0.85%
in the modal country) and a modest share of total taxes paid by households (15.7% in the modal
country). However, informal taxes can still be an important source of local public ￿nance. In
our Indonesia sample, for example, including informal taxation almost triples the estimates of the
amount of revenue under local control.
The second stylized fact we document is that, within individual communities, informal taxation
is redistributive but regressive. Wealthier households in a community are generally more likely to
participate in informal taxation schemes than poorer households. The elasticity of total payment
with respect to household expenditure is positive but less than one in all countries, indicating
that informal taxes rise with expenditure, but the average informal tax rate (i.e., informal taxes
divided by total expenditure) falls with expenditure. Informal taxation is therefore regressive, but
still provides redistribution if the local public good it ￿nances is valued equally across the income
distribution. Informal taxes are more regressive than formal taxes, both within communities and
when examined in aggregate at the national level.
The third stylized fact we document is that the form of payment di⁄ers from a traditional tax;
in particular, in-kind labor payments play a substantial role in informal taxation. Moreover, both
the participation gradient and the elasticity of payment with respect to household expenditure are
smaller for labor payments than for money payments, so that labor payments are relatively more
important for poorer households. All three stylized facts we observe are remarkably consistent
across countries.
2Given these facts, we propose a simple model of informal taxation. Although informal taxation
may appear suboptimal, we argue that it can in fact arise as the solution to a constrained optimal
tax problem. In our model, communities in developing countries wish to ￿nance a public good in
a social welfare maximizing way. Communities face an enforcement constraint (punishments for
non-compliance may be limited) and two information constraints: a hidden income constraint (high
ability types can pretend to be low ability types) and a shirking constraint (those supposed to be
working on public projects can shirk).
We model formal and informal taxation as having di⁄erent constraint parameters, arising from
di⁄erences in their tax technologies. In the informal system, enforcement happens through social
sanctions rather than through courts. This means that the informal tax system can use information
that is observable but not legally veri￿able, so informal taxation mechanisms e⁄ectively have better
information than the formal tax system. On the other hand, by foregoing formal legal proceedings,
the informal system must use less severe punishments ￿i.e., social sanctions instead of jail time
￿which limits the progressivity of the informal taxation system. The choice between formal and
informal taxes therefore represents a trade-o⁄ between enforcement and information.
The model requires few assumptions and parsimoniously explains the observed stylized facts.
Informal taxes are likely to be preferred to formal taxes if evasion costs are low or if the community
can e⁄ectively levy social sanctions. We should therefore expect to see informal taxation in poorer
countries and in rural areas. Informal taxation should have a positive income gradient but will
not necessarily be progressive. Finally, labor payments can be used as a screening device, since
unobservably high ability types face a higher cost of in-kind labor payments relative to monetary
payments. This rationalizes the high observed prevalence of labor payments in the data and the
fact that labor payments have a lower income elasticity than monetary payments.
We argue that the empirical evidence is more consistent with this model than with alternative
models of public goods provision, such as altruism and user fees. Payment decisions do not appear
to be made by households unilaterally: in our Indonesia sample, only 8% of households report that
they decide for themselves whether to pay; 84% report that a local leader decides. A substantial
share of households also report negative consequences for refusal to participate, consistent with the
3anecdotal evidence on informal taxation. While it does appear in some cases that households are
more likely to pay for goods from which they bene￿t, a pure user fee model would not predict the
income gradients observed in the data.
While our framework predicts that informal taxation is more likely to be prevalent in developing
countries, these types of systems may arise whenever there are limits to formal taxation and such
mechanisms are feasible. When Vermont￿ s school ￿nance redistribution law made ￿nancing schools
through higher local taxes more expensive, some communities responded by explicitly pressuring
households and businesses to make "voluntary" contributions to schools (Winerip 2003). School
fund leaders in Manchester, for example, published lists of compliers and encouraged residents to call
or visit non-contributer neighbors (Tomsho 2001). Residents described a variety of sanctions levied
on non-contributers, ranging from speci￿c punishments ("if there is a restaurant that didn￿ t pay, I
know that I￿ m not going to eat there") to more intangible social sanctions ("it￿ s hard to look at those
people in the same way").3 Although our empirical analysis focuses on developing countries, the
model developed here is conceptually applicable to socially enforced extra-governmental provision
of public goods more generally.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing literature and
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the stylized facts. Section 5 develops our model of
informal taxation, and Section 6 considers speci￿c empirical evidence that distinguishes our model
from other potential theories. Section 7 discusses the implications of our ￿ndings and concludes.
2 Existing Evidence on Informal Taxation
Qualitative evidence from a variety of settings suggests that informal taxation is a common form of
local ￿nance for the construction and maintenance of public goods such as roads, schools, and water
systems throughout the developing world (e.g., Ostrom 1991), although formal empirical evidence
on informal taxation remains fairly limited. A range of studies have documented the presence of
3Similar extragovernmental mechanisms were observed in California when Proposition 13 limited local property
taxes (Brunner and Sonstelie 2003). Labor and money contributions to ￿re departments, libraries, and recreational
services have also been shown to increase in response to ￿scal limitations (e.g., Ferris 1984, Bice and Hoyt 2000).
4informal taxation in various countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.4
In many of these countries, informal tax systems appear to form a very important component
of community development. In Indonesia, for example, the concepts of gotong royong (mutual
assistance) and swadaya (self-help) have become deeply institutionalized within local communities:
residents are expected to make labor and monetary payments toward development projects. 37%
of the cost of village public goods examined by Rao (2004) in Indonesia are contributed by the
community. In Kenya, harambee (pull together) projects accounted for 11.4% of national develop-
ment expenditure between 1967 and 1973, and harambee-￿nanced spending on particular sectors,
such as education, matched or exceeded government expenditure (Mbithi and Rasmusson 1977).
Several patterns emerge from the range of anecdotes and studies of informal taxation. First,
payments do not appear to be chosen by households individually. Rather, expected payments
are generally coordinated by community leaders or a project committee. Households may be
expected to provide a given monetary payment, as in the case of school fees in Kenya (Miguel and
Gugerty 2005), or provide a certain number of days of labor (Roseman 1996, Ostrom 1991). In
some cases, there may be a choice between paying in labor or in money (Njoh 2003).
Second, many of these studies document the existence of non-contributers and describe a range
of punishments that may be imposed on such individuals. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) provide
several anecdotal examples of social sanctions in the context of school ￿nancing in western Kenya.5
A common sanction is the public announcement of the names of parents who are late with fees;
other forms of sanctions include "sending letters to the homes of parents late with fees, asking local
church leaders to encourage payment during sermons, and making personal visits to the individual
homes of debtors accompanied by the local Chief" (Miguel and Gugerty 2005). Other examples of
punishments include ￿nes (Ostrom 1991) and the denial of access to communal resources, such as
the use of a cattledip (Thomas 1987). It is possible that punishments could also include exclusion
from community credit or risk-sharing arrangements or other types of social enforcement, as in the
4A non-exhaustive list of countries includes Cameroon (Njoh 2003), China (Eckaus 2003), India (Rao 2004),
Indonesia (Rao 2004, Beard 2007), Kenya (Mbithi and Rasmusson 1977, Thomas 1987, Barkan and Holmquist 1989,
Miguel and Gugerty 2005, Ngau 1987), Nigeria (Barkan, McNulty and Ayeni 1991), Pakistan (Khwaja 2007), Peru
(Larrabure 1966), and Zaire (Prud￿ homme 1992).
5The paper argues that limited ability to impose social sanctions in ethnically diverse communities leads to lower
￿nancing of local public goods.
5informal insurance and micro￿nance literatures.
Our own direct experience with informal taxation in a village in Central Java, Indonesia, echoes
many of these themes. In 2002, a village where one of the authors was staying received 29 drums
of raw asphalt from the district government. In order to make use of the raw asphalt to resurface
a road, the village needed to raise funds for additional materials (e.g., ￿nely crushed gravel, coarse
gravel, sand) as well as labor. To solve this problem, the village head called a meeting in the
neighborhood where the road would be built. At that meeting, the village head, neighborhood
head and an informal community leader (a local school teacher), went around the room "assigning"
payments to each household. These payments increased with income: poorer households would
be asked to pay a small amount (usually a few days of labor), whereas wealthier households were
asked to pay in money, with the wealthiest households asked to pay the most. The meeting did
not specify what sanctions would be for non-payment; however, given that payments were assigned
in a public meeting, one can presume that there would have been social pressure applied to those
who failed to meet their assigned payment level.
To the best of our knowledge, quantitative work on the distribution of informal tax burdens has
focused on two countries: Indonesia and Kenya. Beard (2007) ￿nds that Indonesian households
with more assets or more education pay more in labor and money toward informal taxation; those
with high household expenditure pay less. Note that these e⁄ects are not unconditional: regressions
include all of these factors as independent variables. In surveys of particular communities in Kenya,
Thomas (1987) ￿nds that labor payments are widespread and that the rich are more likely to make
cash payments than the poor, and Barkan and Holmquist (1989) ￿nd that participation and labor
payments tend to follow an inverse U-shape with respect to landholding while payments in cash
are increasing in landholding.
An open question is whether or not informal tax mechanisms appear similar across the broad
range of countries in which they are observed. In the next sections of the paper, we provide
systematic cross-country evidence to document several stylized facts about informal taxation.
63 Data
We compiled microdata from around the world to create a dataset that covers the phenomenon
of informal taxation in as many countries as possible. We examined over 100 household surveys,
including (but not limited to) every publicly available World Bank Living Standards Measurement
Study (LSMS) survey.6 To be included in our sample, a survey needed to elicit information specif-
ically about payment towards the provision of local public goods. A typical example of such a
question is: "In the last 12 months did you personally or any other member of the household par-
ticipate in any of the following ... participate in the collective construction of community works
(roads, schools etc.)."7 Our sample includes every household survey that met this criterion. We
did not include surveys that asked only about labor sharing agreements among neighbors or con-
tributions to local social organizations or cases in which the labor was clearly compensated, such
as paid public works days.8
In addition to these pre-existing datasets, we designed a special survey module on informal tax-
ation for the Health and Education Service Survey in Indonesia. This survey module included de-
tailed questions on labor and monetary payments as well as questions on the decision-making process
and enforcement of informal taxation not available on the other surveys in the sample. The Indone-
sia survey was conducted by Gadjah Mada University and The World Bank as a baseline survey for
a poverty-alleviation program. The survey took place in 5 provinces from June-September 2007,
and covered a total of 12,000 households in over 2,300 villages. More details about the survey can be
found in Olken, Onishi, and Wong (2008).
The types of community works mentioned on these surveys include roads, water and sanitation
systems, schools, health centers, dams and irrigation systems, electricity systems, and cleaning
of public roads and areas.9 While we refer to these goods as local public goods, they may be
excludable in some cases. We return to this issue in Section 6.
6The review of surveys was conducted in the summer of 2006.
7Guatemala, National Survey of Living Conditions, 2000.
8It is still possible that in some cases those paying labor are partially compensated by being provided food or
other bene￿ts not observed in our data.
9The Indonesia and Philippines surveys also includes payments towards religious places. All results remain very
similar if we exclude those who only made these types of payments.
7The resulting sample consists of household surveys from 10 countries: Albania, Ethiopia,
Guatemala, Indonesia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Panama, the Philippines, Vietnam and Zambia.10 The
sample is geographically diverse, including countries from Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia.
Table 1 provides an overview of our sample of household surveys. The surveys were conducted
between 1997 and 2007, and sample sizes range from approximately 1,500 to 30,000. The surveys
are nationally representative with the exceptions of Ethiopia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which
were conducted in rural areas only. Indonesia and the Philippines focus on a poorer-than-average
selection of rural areas, since both surveys were conducted as baseline surveys for poverty allevia-
tion programs. As shown in the table, all surveys contain information on in-kind labor payments
toward public goods; monetary payments and quantity data are available for subsets of countries.
Note that the recall period varies across surveys: while most surveys ask about payments over
the past year, one survey (Philippines) asks only about the previous six months and two surveys
(Nicaragua and Zambia) ask about the previous 5 years (see Appendix A for more details).
Summary statistics for each survey are given in Table 2. The summary statistics (as well as
per-capita GDP from the World Development Indicators) indicate the breadth of countries covered
by our data. For example, per-capita GDP in the surveyed countries ranges from a low of PP$774
in Zambia to a high of PP$6129 in Panama, and mean years of education for the household head
ranges from a low of 2.5 in Ethiopia to a high of 9.6 in Albania.
We include survey data from all available countries in our empirical analysis in order to paint as
complete a picture as possible of the informal taxation phenomenon. One caveat, however, is worth
noting explicitly. To the best of our knowledge, public labor contributions are legally mandated
in Vietnam. If an individual cannot ful￿ll his required contribution, he must ￿nd a replacement
worker or make a monetary payment equivalent to hiring a replacement at local labor costs.11 The
10Two countries had multiple surveys: Vietnam and Indonesia. In Vietnam, surveys were conducted in 1998 and
2002; we use the 2002 data which has ￿ve times the sample size of the 1998 data. The 2000 Indonesia Family
Life Survey (IFLS) asks about informal taxation, but only measures routine cleaning activities. We therefore use
our survey module for Indonesia which has more comprehensive questions about informal tax payments. A potential
concern with our sample of countries is that relevant survey questions are more likely to be included in countries
where the phenomenon is prevalent. As discussed in Section 2, anecdotal evidence indicates that informal taxation
is common in many other countries that are similar to our sampled countries.
11Speci￿cally, as of the year 2000, each citizen (men 18-45 yrs old, women 18-35) is required to participate in public
service work, for 10 days per year. If one cannot participate, the individual needs to ￿nd some replacement worker
or submit a ￿nancial contribution either to the commune/ward people￿ s committee or to the individual￿ s employing
8payments observed in Vietnam may therefore be a formal tax rather than an informal tax; we
discuss this in more detail below.
4 Stylized Facts and Implications
This section presents several stylized facts about informal taxation. We focus on the following
questions that are relevant when thinking about any tax: where is it most prevalent? how large
is it? who pays it? and how is it collected? The ￿rst subsection summarizes the prevalence and
magnitude of informal taxation and compares the magnitude of informal taxation to formal tax
payments made by households and to formal government expenditure. In the second subsection,
we examine the distributional implications of informal tax payments and discuss the progressivity
of informal taxation relative to formal taxation. The third subsection discusses how these taxes are
collected and explores a feature of informal taxation that sharply distinguishes it from conventional
taxation: payments are often in labor rather than money. The ￿nal subsection provides a brief
discussion of the implications of these ￿ndings for public ￿nance in developing countries.
4.1 Prevalence and Magnitude of Informal Taxation
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics on prevalence and magnitude
We begin by presenting descriptive statistics to examine the most basic question about informal
taxation: prevalence. Table 3 presents three sets of descriptive statistics: the share of households
making informal taxation payments over the recall period (Panel A), the share of households making
in-kind labor payments vs. payments in money and materials (Panel B), and the average amounts
of those payments (Panel C) for each country in our sample.12
institution/enterprise. This payment is once per year (per individual), and the required amount is set equivalent to
the hiring of replacements at local labor costs. The law speci￿es di⁄erent degrees of formal punishments depending
the type of violations: for example, avoidance for the ￿rst time gets a warning and ￿ne. We thank Trang Nguyen for
providing this information.
12As noted above, the recall period di⁄ers across surveys. We report annualized amounts for quantities but do not
adjust the participation data. To facilitate interpretation, the surveys in this and subsequent tables are sorted by
survey recall period. For surveys in which respondents were asked only about labor payments, the listed participation
rates for "overall participation" can be thought of as lower bounds on true participation rates.
9Informal taxation is prevalent in all surveyed countries (Panel A). With the exception of Alba-
nia, participation rates are 20% or higher in all countries and exceed 50% in Ethiopia, Indonesia,
and Vietnam. Informal taxation is more prevalent in rural areas in every country in our sample for
which we have data on both. Across the sample, participation rates are between 27% (Vietnam)
and 183% (Guatemala) higher in rural areas than in urban areas.
In-kind payments in the form of labor are common in all countries (Panel B). The share of
households paying in labor is higher than the share of households paying in money in 3 of the 5
countries for which we have data on both labor and monetary payments (Indonesia, Nicaragua,
and Zambia). In the other two countries (Panama and Vietnam), labor payments are still quite
common, with 19 and 24 percent of households making payments in labor, respectively. The gap
between urban and rural is smaller for monetary payments than for labor payments in all cases.
Panel C shows the magnitude of informal tax payments for all countries for which quantity data
are available. The ￿gures shown represent annualized labor payments (in days) and annualized
monetary payments (in 2000 PPP US dollars). Average labor payments vary from 0.2 days per
year in Albania to 14.1 days per year in Ethiopia.
4.1.2 Informal taxes and formal taxes paid by households
To better gauge the magnitude of informal taxation, we compare it to two types of benchmarks.
In this subsection, we examine the burden it imposes on households by comparing informal tax
payments to household expenditure and to total taxes paid by households. These benchmarks
are available for the same households for whom we have data on informal taxation payments,
ensuring consistent samples for comparison. In the next subsection, we compare informal taxation
to government budgets.
In order to make these comparisons, we monetize the labor payments made by households
to construct a measure of total informal tax payments. To do so, we predict the wage for all
working household members based on their education, age, gender, and urban/rural status, and
value the labor contributions at the average predicted wage for all working household members.13
13To predict wages, we ￿rst we approximate monthly household income per worker as annual household expenditure
10This method values the marginal and average wage of the household equally. This assumption
is consistent with Benjamin (1992) who shows that household composition does not a⁄ect own-
farm labor supply for agricultural households in Indonesia, suggesting that labor markets for these
households are competitive and complete. Since predicted wages vary across households, the
magnitude of informal taxation is measured as the social cost of production.14 We use equivalence
scale adjusted household expenditure as our measure of household income.15
Data on total tax payments comes from two sources. Direct formal taxes paid by households
are calculated as the sum of all direct tax payments observed in the data, and include items such as
land and buildings taxes and personal income taxes. Indirect formal taxes (VAT) are imputed from
consumption data and VAT and excise rates for each country. We do not include expenditures
on food in our VAT estimates, since most households in developing countries are unlikely to pay
VAT on most food consumption in practice. Total formal taxes are the sum of direct and imputed
indirect taxes. Further details on the calculation of direct and indirect taxes are given in Appendix
divided by 12 and the number of workers in the household. We then regress the household monthly wage rate on
each individual￿ s education, age, and age squared interacted with a female dummy, an urban dummy, and a female x
urban dummy. We then divide by the number of working days in a month, which we de￿ne as 21.7, to get a measure
of the household daily wage rate. 21.7 ’ (365.25/12)*( 5/7), where 5/7 adjusts the wage rate for working days per
week. We repeat this prediction separately for each country. We use the predicted daily wage rate, rather than the
household daily wage rate, so that when we regress payments on household expenditures below, we will not be using
expenditures on both the left hand and right hand sides of the same regression.
14Note that this is not necessarily the same as the value of the output produced, particularly if labor payments are
made by individuals whose wage rates exceed the unskilled wage rate. Note also that this measure may be biased if
labor contributions are made by those with the lowest opportunity cost of time, making the average household wage
an overestimate. On the hand, it is possible that some people who are listed as "working" do not work a full 260
work days per year, which would lead us to underestimate their true wage rate, or that those who contribute are
prime-age males with a higher marginal product than the average in the household. We discuss speci￿cations using
labor measured in days rather than monetized days below.
15Income data from developing country household surveys is often unreliable, so we follow the standard convention
of using household expenditures as a proxy for household income throughout the paper. Since household expenditure
includes direct and indirect taxes, it is conceptually a "pre-tax" measure. To be consistent, one might also want to
add back income lost as a result of informal tax payments. Since our measure of the household wage rate is likely to
be noisy, we do not make this adjustment.
Following Deaton 1997, we de￿ne equivalent expenditure as
household expenditure
(adults + ￿1children + ￿2infants)
￿
Infants are de￿ned as those aged 0-4; children are de￿ned as those aged 5 to 14. Combining Deaton 1997￿ s estimates
of total child costs and Olken 2005￿ s estimates of household economies of scale, we set ￿1 = 0:6 and ￿2 = 0:5 and
￿ = 0:85.
As an alternative, we have veri￿ed that all empirical results are qualitatively similar if we use log total household
expenditure and a set of household size dummies instead of log equivalent expenditure.
11A.
Using this data, we calculate informal taxes as a share of total household expenditure and
informal taxes as a share of total household taxes (informal + direct formal + indirect formal).
Table 4 presents the mean of these variables for each country in the dataset. Since some households
may live in areas where informal taxation does not occur, we present both results for all households
(rows 1 and 3) and for all households that have non-zero informal tax payments (rows 2 and 4).
Overall, informal taxation appears to comprise a small share of household expenditure, although
there is substantial heterogeneity across countries. Mean informal taxation payments range from
a low of 0.04% of household expenditure in Albania to a high of 3.8% in Ethiopia. Conditional on
making any informal tax payments, shares range from 0.37% (Albania) to 6.8% (Ethiopia).
Informal taxes are a moderate share of total taxes paid by households: mean shares are 0.5%
in Albania, 7% in the Philippines, 16% in Vietnam, 17% in Indonesia, and 27% in Ethiopia. As a
share of total tax payments, informal taxes are therefore broadly comparable in magnitude to local
or state taxes in the United States.
4.1.3 Informal taxes and formal government expenditure
To understand how important informal taxation is to local public ￿nance, we compare informal
taxation to government budgets. We focus on Indonesia, where for the 2001 budget year we
have data on both district expenditures and village expenditures for the districts and villages in
our survey area.16 We convert all amounts to 2000 PPP dollars. We calculate the mean per-
household level of informal taxes and formal taxes from the household survey, as well as the mean
per-household level of village and district revenues and village and district expenditures for our
sample area; results are given in Table 5.17
We ￿nd that informal taxes are large relative to village budgets. Average annual per household
16District budget data in Indonesia is available annually through 2005. Village budgets, however, are only collected
once every decade in the census of villages (PODES); the most recent data comes from the 2002-2003 census of
villages, which asked about village budgets during 2001. We therefore use 2001 district budget data as well to ensure
comparability with the village data.
17Note that the village budgets were available for 19 of the 20 districts in our household survey area. We have
therefore calculated all statistics in Table 5 on the same set of 19 districts to ensure maximum comparability. Note
also that the household survey sample only includes subdistricts that are no more than 70% urban, so it potentially
excludes the very urban central areas of a few districts.
12village budgets are 43.67 dollars per year, whereas our household survey suggests that per household
informal taxes are 49.86 dollars per year. Moreover, the o¢ cial village budget actually already
includes 13.09 dollars per year in "on-the-books" informal tax payments. If we subtract the 13.09
dollars per year in informal tax payments from the village budget to avoid double-counting, then
informal taxes ￿at 49.86 per year ￿are 1.6 times as large as all other sources of revenue in the village
budget (30.59 dollars per year). The inclusion of informal taxation in the village budget indicates
that local governments view informal taxation explicitly as a source of government revenue, and
the magnitudes demonstrate that informal taxation is one of the primary ways through which local
public goods are ￿nanced by these villages.
We next compare informal taxation to district budgets. Since Indonesia￿ s decentralization be-
gan in 2001, Indonesian districts have primary responsibility for virtually all local public goods,
including local infrastructure, water, health, and education.18 The budget is divided into routine
expenditures (mostly civil servant salaries) and development expenditures (mostly capital expen-
ditures).19 These district budgets also include the intergovernmental transfers to villages, so these
budgets should be viewed as a superset of the village budgets. Informal taxation payments are 7%
as large as total district budgets, and 22% as large as district spending on development expendi-
tures. This implies that a non-trivial share of all spending on local public goods occurs through
the informal taxation mechanism.
Third, we compare informal taxes with the other taxes that are under the control of local
government: formal taxes and fees collected by the village and district governments. Table 5 shows
that, other than informal taxation, sources of formal tax revenue under direct control of local
governments are extremely limited, as most revenue comes from intergovernmental grants from the
national government (which administers the VAT and other taxes). Informal taxes are 12 times
larger than total village formal taxes and almost triple total district level formal taxes and fees.
Informal taxes are therefore ￿by far ￿the largest source of ￿nance that is under local control.
The above ￿gures present estimates of informal taxes in which labor payments are monetized
18Note that since 2001 was the ￿rst year of decentralization, districts may have unsure as to the total amount of
central transfers they would receive and budgeted conservatively, resulting in a surplus.
19Note that informal taxation payments are not reported in district budgets, so double-counting is not an issue in
this comparison.
13as described in the previous section. We have also constructed estimates of informal taxes in which
labor payments are monetized using the local unskilled wage rate.20 The resulting estimates of per
household informal taxes decline only slightly, from 49.86 to 44.30 dollars per year. This adjustment
does not substantively a⁄ect any of our conclusions about the importance of informal taxes as a
local revenue source.
4.2 Distributional Implications of Informal Taxation
This section examines the distributional implications of informal taxation by looking at the rela-
tionship between informal taxation payments and household expenditure. We begin by examining
the distribution of informal taxation payments within communities, which tells us how the bur-
den for ￿nancing a given level of public goods is borne across high and low income individuals
in those communities. Since informal taxation payments are determined at the community level,
this within-community analysis is the level of analysis one needs for developing models of informal
taxation. We then compare the aggregate burden of informal and formal taxation across the in-
come distribution. We do not compare informal taxes directly across communities within country,
since the level, type, and quality of public goods provided are likely to vary unobservably across
communities.
4.2.1 Informal taxation within communities
We ￿rst examine the participation margin ￿i.e., which households make informal taxation pay-
ments. We estimate the following conditional logit speci￿cation via maximum likelihood:
P
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PAYhc = Tc
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exp
hPHc
h=1 PAYhc (￿LN (EQUIV EXP)hc)
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P
dc2Sc exp
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h=1 dhc (￿LN (EQUIV EXP)hc)
i (1)
20The local unskilled wage rate is calculated using survey information provided by the village head. We sum the
daily wage of a male laborer in the month of the interview in the village/ward with the average value per day of
goods provided for consumption while working (if applicable). We then divided by the number of hours worked by
laborers on an average day and multiplied by 6 to get the value of labor for a "normal" work day at the village level.
14where h represents a household, c represents a community, PAYhc is a dummy for whether house-
hold c made any payments, PAYc is the vector of PAYhc for all households h in community c,
LN (EQUIV EXP) is a measure of log household expenditure per equivalent adult, Tc is the num-
ber of respondents in community c who reported any payments, and Sc is the set of all possible
vectors dc = fd1c;:::;dHccg such that
PHc
h=1 dhc = Tc.21 The key coe¢ cient of interest is ￿, which is
the elasticity of the probability of making payments with respect to equivalent household expendi-
ture. Robust standard errors in this and subsequent regressions are adjusted for clustering at the
community level.
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 6. Each cell in the table reports the coe¢ cient
on log equivalent household expenditure (￿) from a separate regression of the form in equation
(1).22 The estimated overall participation-expenditure gradient is statistically signi￿cantly positive
in 6 of the 10 countries in our sample and is never negative and statistically signi￿cant. The
modal elasticity among all 10 countries in the sample is about 0.2. This demonstrates that the
probability of payment is increasing with household expenditure within communities, and this
pattern is generally consistent throughout the the countries in our sample.
We next examine the relationship between the quantity of payments and expenditure for coun-
tries for which data on the quantity of payments are available. Given the large number of ob-
servations with no payments, we estimate this relationship as a ￿xed-e⁄ects Poisson quasi-MLE
regression with robust standard errors (Hausman, Hall and Griliches 1984, Wooldridge 1999; see
also Wooldridge 2002). This estimates, by MLE, equations such that
E(PAY MENTAMOUNThc) = ￿c exp(￿LN (EQUIV EXP)hc) (2)
where ￿c is a community ￿xed-e⁄ect, and PAY MENTMOUNT is the quantity of total payments
(in local currency). Given the Poisson QMLE speci￿cation, the resulting coe¢ cients ￿ can be
interpreted as elasticities.
21Note that for the Philippines, Albania, Ethopia, Guatemala, and Nigeria, the PAY variable refers to in-kind
labor payments only. For all other countries, the PAY variable captures both monetary and in-kind payments.
22As discussed above, we obtain similar results in this and subsequent speci￿cations if we regress contributions on
log household expenditure and add as controls dummies for household size (not shown).
15To calculate PAY MENTAMOUNT, we monetize labor payments using the imputed average
household wage as described above.23 By allowing the wage to vary with household income, we
incorporate the fact that providing a day of labor is more costly for those with high opportunity
cost.
The results (Table 6, Panel B) show that total payments are increasing in expenditure in all
countries for which we have quantity data, and the coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant in all cases.
The estimated elasticities of informal taxation payments with respect to equivalent expenditure are
0.40 in the Philippines, 0.33 in Albania, 0.13 in Ethiopia, 0.39 in Indonesia, and 0.08 in Vietnam.
These elasticities are also strictly and statistically signi￿cantly less than 1, indicating that while
payments increase with expenditure, the share of household expenditures devoted to informal tax
payments (i.e., the average tax rate) is declining with expenditure.24 Payments are also increasing
in expenditure even conditional on making a positive informal tax payment (Table 6, Panel C), so
the overall e⁄ects are driven by the intensive margin as well as the extensive margin.
Together, the results tell a consistent story: within communities, the wealthy pay more in
informal taxes than the poor on an absolute level, though they pay less as a share of their total
resources.
4.2.2 Comparing formal and informal taxation
We next compare informal taxes to formal direct and indirect tax payments by households. The
results are presented in Table 7. For comparison purposes, Panel A shows the relationship between
informal taxes and equivalent household expenditures with community ￿xed e⁄ects. Panel B repeats
the same regressions for direct formal taxes, and Panel C repeats the regressions for total direct
23As an alternative, we have considered a speci￿cation in which we examine days, rather than monetizing by the
wage rate (results not reported). As one would expect, the coe¢ cients examining just days are generally smaller than
in the monetized days speci￿cation, although the gradient remains positive and signi￿cant in Albania and Indonesia
and positive and insigni￿cant in the Philippines and Ethiopia. The coe¢ cient for Vietnam is negative and signi￿cant,
which may re￿ ect features of the mandatory labor payment system.
24Note that monetizing labor payments at a common rate, rather than at the predicted household wage rate as
we do, would make informal taxation appear even more regressive. One might be concerned that measurement
error in household expenditure data could cause the estimates to be less than one even if informal taxation is truly
progressive. However, applying the classical measurement error attenuation bias formula to our estimates shows that
measurement error would have to account for more than 60% of the total variation in observed household expenditures
in all countries in order for this to be the case.
16and indirect formal taxes.25
The results in Table 7 show that in all countries we examine, the estimated elasticities of formal
taxes with respect to household expenditure are greater than the estimated elasticities for informal
taxes. For example, the elasticity of formal direct taxes with respect to household consumption
Table 8 is 1.526 in the Philippines, 1.433 in Albania, and 1.372 in Indonesia, so that formal direct
taxes are progressive in these countries. By comparison, the analogous elasticity for informal taxes
is 0.395 in the Philippines, 0.334 in Albania, and 0.387 in Indonesia, so informal taxes are on
average regressive. Informal taxes are levied by local governments, whereas VAT and formal direct
taxes tend to be levied by state or national governments, so these are not necessarily taxes levied
by the same level of government; nevertheless, these regressions are all within community, and the
di⁄erence in progressivity is substantial. Analogous regressions without community ￿xed e⁄ects
produce similar results.
Figure 1 illustrates these di⁄erences graphically, plotting informal taxes, direct formal taxes
and total formal taxes (i.e., direct + indirect), all expressed as percentages of total household
expenditure. For each country, we plot the results of a non-parametric Fan regression (Fan 1992)
of each variable against log equivalent household expenditure. These regressions do not include
community ￿xed e⁄ects, so they represent average progressivity or regressivity across our entire
sample in each country. The solid lines in Figure 1 show informal taxes, the dashed lines shows
direct formal taxes, and the dotted line shows total formal taxes. For comparison, we also plot a
histogram of log equivalent household expenditure. To keep the graphs readable, we have excluded
the bottom 0.5% and top 0.5% of the household expenditure distribution. The most striking fact
about these graphs is that the formal tax system is progressive in most countries whereas the
informal tax system is regressive. Including informal taxation therefore makes the total tax burden
look more regressive than previously thought.
25Note that since formal indirect taxes are imputed by applying VAT rates to di⁄erent categories of consumption
(see Appendix A), measurement error will bias the coe¢ cients on formal indirect taxes towards 1. In that sense
the most meaningful comparisons are between informal taxes and formal direct taxes, both of which are estimated
completely independently of household consumption.
174.3 Monetary vs. In-Kind Payments
A notable feature of informal taxation is that payments are often made in labor rather than money
(Table 3). To better understand this phenomenon, it is useful to understand in more detail which
types of households pay in labor versus money.
To do so, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) separately for each type of payment, focusing
on the countries for where we have data on both monetary and in-kind labor payments. In the
quantity analysis, to be consistent with the previous tables, we continue to value labor payments
at the household￿ s predicted average wage rate. Using days instead of monetized labor payments
generally makes the reported estimates for labor smaller and accentuates the di⁄erence between
labor and money more than shown in the tables here.
The results for the participation margin ￿does the household pay any labor or any money ￿
are presented in Panel A of Table 8, and the results on the quantity paid are presented in Panel
B of Table 8. The results in both panels show a very clear pattern: for almost all countries in the
sample, monetary payments increase more quickly with overall household expenditure than in-kind
labor payments. This is true both on the participation margin and, for the two countries where
we have quantity data, on the quantity margin as well. For example, looking within communities
in Indonesia, the elasticity of labor payments with respect to household expenditure is 0.26, but
the elasticity of monetary payments with respect to household expenditure is 1.45 (see Panel B of
Table 8). This implies that monetary contributions are particularly concentrated at higher income
levels, a fact we return to in the theoretical framework below.
4.4 Implications
These stylized facts have several implications for public ￿nance in developing countries. First,
a substantial share of households in many developing countries participate in these mechanisms.
Informal taxation can be the dominant source of revenue for local communities and may be a non-
trivial component of national spending on public capital improvements in developing countries.
Failing to take informal taxation into account will lead to underestimates of the tax burden faced
by households, the size of the public sector, and the level of decentralization. Second, informal
18taxation is redistributive but regressive, and this pattern is observed in almost all of our sample
countries. Formal taxes appear to be more progressive than informal taxes, so estimates of formal
taxes alone may result in overestimates of the overall progressivity of the tax system. Finally,
a notable feature of informal taxation is that in-kind labor payments are an important source
of ￿nance and are made even by households with relatively high household expenditure. While
measuring a household￿ s true opportunity cost of time is di¢ cult, the ￿ndings certainly suggest
that at least some households are making ine¢ cient payments in labor.
These ￿ndings also raise a number of questions. Why would communities choose such mecha-
nisms of ￿nance, and why do they tend to be concentrated in developing countries and poor and
rural areas? What determines the distribution of payments across individuals within a community,
and why do wealthier households pay more than poorer households? Why are in-kind payments so
prevalent in informal tax systems when they are rarely seen as part of modern formal tax systems,
and why might ine¢ cient labor payments arise in equilibrium?
In the next section of the paper, we provide a framework for thinking about informal taxation.
The goal of the model is two-fold: to formalize the trade-o⁄s between informal taxation and formal
taxation, and to show that the observed prevalence, distribution, and form of informal taxation
can be explained by thinking of informal taxation as a solution to a constrained optimal taxation
problem.
5 A Model of Informal Taxation
The stylized facts we observe are remarkably consistent across countries. This section develops a
simple framework for thinking about informal taxation that does not require non-standard pref-
erences, government corruption, or market failures in labor or credit markets, but instead treats
informal taxation as one possible solution to an optimal tax problem, with asymmetric information
and screening. We discuss alternative models in Section 6.
In our model, local governments face a standard problem: ￿nancing local public goods in a
social welfare maximizing way. We consider three sources of departure from the ￿rst best. As
19in standard taxation models, governments face information constraints about true earnings ability.
Our model adds two additional constraints: governments may face constraints on their ability to
enforce the desired tax schedule, and they may also face constraints on labor taxes, since individuals
can shirk on required labor payments. These information and enforcement constraints limit the
degree to which the government can achieve redistribution in ￿nancing the public good.
We model formal and informal taxes as having di⁄erent constraint parameters arising from
di⁄erences in their tax technologies. In the informal system, enforcement happens through social
sanctions rather than through courts. This means that the informal system must use less severe
punishments than the formal system, i.e., social sanctions instead of jail time. However, the
informal tax system can use information that does not meet the burden of proof required in court
(i.e., information that is observable but not veri￿able), so it e⁄ectively has better information than
the formal tax system. 26
We demonstrate that informal taxation may be the optimal solution to the government￿ s con-
strained maximization problem and show that the model￿ s predictions are consistent with the
observed patterns of informal tax prevalence. We also show that the predictions of the model
match the stylized facts on the distribution and form of informal tax payments.
Modeling these payments as the equilibrium of a screening mechanism di⁄ers from the literature
on voluntary contributions to public goods, which often models contributions driven by a personal
desire to a⁄ect the level of the public good (e.g., Olson 1965), a warm-glow from donations (e.g.,
Andreoni 1990), or to signal wealth to others (e.g., Glazer and Konrad 1996). others have modeled
private provision of public goods in a collective action framework (e.g., Bagnoli and Lipman 1989,
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986). Masclet, et al. (2003) and Falk et al. (2005) have emphasized
the role of social sanctions as a mechanism through which the free rider problem can be overcome,
and Fehr and Gachter (2000) show experimentally that cooperators are willing to punish free-riders
even if this is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future bene￿ts from their punishment
26Another possible constraint on redistribution is exit from the local community. Exit would a⁄ect both formal
and informal taxes in the same way, so for simplicity, we do not consider the issue of exit here. In practice, mobility
is often low in developing countries (Bardhan 2002). Abramitzky (2008) explores the issue of exit as a constraint on
redistribution in a di⁄erent context, that of Israeli kibbutzim.
20activities.27 To the best of our knowledge, little work has focused on formally modeling informal
tax mechanisms speci￿cally. An exception is Wilson (1992), who argues that cooperation in a
repeated prisoner￿ s dilemma game may be sustainable in the context of harambee programs in
Kenya.
This section proceeds as follows. We begin in section 5.1 by setting up the general social
planner￿ s maximization problem as a two-type screening model with enforcement and information
constraints and discuss characteristics of the general solution. We then introduce informal and
formal taxation in the context of this model by varying the enforcement and information constraints.
Section 5.2 discusses the implications of the model for the empirics of informal taxation.
5.1 Model
5.1.1 Setup
Suppose that there are N individuals. A fraction ￿ of the individuals have wage wH and a frac-
tion 1 ￿ ￿ have wage wL where wL < wH. We assume that w is private information and that
each individual has an endowment of time 1 which they spend working. Since we are primarily
interested in the tradeo⁄ between enforcement and information, we model all behavioral responses
coming through an evasion decision rather than through a labor supply decision. This assumption
seems plausible in the contexts we are studying, and also allows us to capture the idea that local
communities may have information on earnings ability rather than just earnings. Each individual￿ s
wealth is therefore equal to his wage rate. There are no savings, so individuals consume their
entire wealth after paying any taxes.
Each individual i can potentially consume two goods, the private good (wi) and the public good
(g). If the public good is provided, all individuals consume it and g = 1; if it is not provided, then
g = 0. We assume that utility over the private good is concave and that the utility from the private
27On the empirical side, the lower public good provision in ethnically diverse communities has been explained using
the theory of social sanctions: Miguel and Gugerty (2005) argue that social sanctions are harder to enforce between
di⁄erent ethnic groups, which explains the lower contributions to public goods in diverse communities. Alesina et al.
(1999) also show empirically that more diverse communities have lower public good provision.
21and public good are separable, i.e.
U = u(wi) + ￿g
where u is concave and ￿ indicates the value from consuming the public good. We assume that u
has the property that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is greater than 1 (i.e.,
￿wu00(w)
u0(w) > 1).28
The public good costs G to produce, and once produced is both non-rival and non-excludable.
G is determined exogenously.29 For the public good to be provided, total government revenue R
must be greater than or equal to G. We assume that providing the public good is e¢ cient, so that
the ￿rst-best involves providing the public good.
We assume that the goal of the government is to ￿nance the public good in a way that maximizes
social welfare. Taxes cannot be negative; in other words, redistribution occurs only through
progressive payments toward the public good.30
Taxes can potentially be levied in two forms: money and labor. De￿ne ￿H and ￿L as the
monetary payments from the high and low type. De￿ne ￿H and ￿L as the labor payments from
the high and low type, de￿ned as a share of each type￿ s total time budget. After-tax income for
type i is then wi (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i.
We assume that ￿i is publicly valued at the low type wage rate wL, i.e., ￿ is always used for
low-skill tasks. This implies that labor by the high type is ine¢ cient, since it is valued at the
opportunity cost wH by the high type but valued at wL in the government budget constraint. As
we show below, this asymmetry in the value of labor means that the government can use labor as
28This assumption guarantees a single-crossing property which is necessary to allow screening using labor taxes
(￿), discussed in more detail below. To see this, note that
@
2U
@￿@w
= ￿wu
00 (w) ￿ u
0 (w)
If
￿wu00(w)
u0(w) > 1, then
@2U
@￿@w > 0, so that the marginal utility cost of an extra hour worked is strictly increasing in
wealth.
29We focus here on the decisions made by local government trying to raised a ￿xed amount of revenue to ￿nance
a public good, abstracting from intergovernmental transfers and endogenous public good size.
30In a system where a large share of payments take the form of in-kind unskilled labor, positive net transfers (i.e.,
net receipt of unskilled labor) could be di¢ cult to implement. In addition, we can observe only payments (either
zero or positive) to the public good in the data. General transfer payments, if any, may occur through a di⁄erent
mechanism. In this respect, we can think of informal taxation as somewhat analagous to a property tax system (a
tax levied to ￿nance a set of goods) that may exist in addition to a traditional income tax and transfer system.
22a screening device.31
We assume that the social planner faces three types of constraints in designing the optimal
allocation. First, there is the enforcement constraint: if a given type fails to pay his required taxes,
the planner can impose a utility punishment up to a maximum of P. This punishment P enters the
planner￿ s problem as an IR constraint. Second, there is the hidden income constraint: by paying a
utility cost D, a high type can hide his income and pretend to be a low type. Third, there is the
shirking constraint: by paying a utility cost S, the type who is supposed to do the higher amount
of work in labor can shirk and do only the lowest amount of labor required of any type (denoted
￿).32 The hidden income and shirking constraints enter the planner￿ s problem as IC constraints.
Together, the triplet of costs, (P;D;S), is what we refer to as the technology of the tax system.
We will model informal vs. formal taxation as having di⁄erent tax system technologies.
5.1.2 Planner￿ s problem and characteristics of the solution
Faced with a given tax technology (P;D;S), the social planner￿ s problem is to maximize social
welfare subject to the enforcement (IR), hidden income (IC), and shirking (IC) constraints, i.e., he
solves:
max
(￿i;￿i)
￿(u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(u(wL (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L)) + ￿ (3)
subject to the enforcement constraints (IR):
u(wH) ￿ P ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) (ECH)
u(wL) ￿ P ￿ u(wL (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L) (ECL)
31While use of labor as a screening device has been considered in the design of income maintenance programs (e.g.,
Besley and Coate 1992), it has not, to the best of our knowledge, been considered in the context of raising revenue.
32Note that hiding income allows the high type to pretend to be the low type and pay the labor and money taxes
required by the low type, whereas shirking allows each type to do the minimum amount of required labor without
a⁄ecting the monetary taxes.
23hidden income constraints (IC):
u(wH (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L) ￿ D ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) (HIH)
u(wL (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) ￿ D ￿ u(wL (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L) (HIL)
shirking constraints (IC):
u(wH (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿H) ￿ S ￿ u(wH (1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ ￿H) (SCH)
u(wL (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿L) ￿ S ￿ u(wL (1 ￿ ￿L) ￿ ￿L) (SCL)
the government budget constraint:
￿(￿H + wL￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿L + wL￿L) =
G
N
and non-negativity constraints:
￿i ￿ 0, ￿i ￿ 0 8i
Note that in the ￿rst best (when no constraints bind), the planner will set taxes so that the
after-tax marginal utilities are equal for the two types; if the non-negativity constraint binds, the
optimum in the ￿rst-best will be to set ￿￿
L = 0 and ￿￿
H = G
￿N.
Several comments are worth making about the general solution to this problem. We ￿rst
examine the form of tax payments of each type and then discuss the distributional implications.
Remark 1 The high type will always pay in money, not in labor.
Proof. All proofs are given in Appendix B.
The fact that the high type always pays in money, not labor, is the equivalent of the "no
distortion at the top" result from the optimal tax literature (Mirrlees 1971). Note that this is not
simply a productive e¢ ciency result; as we discuss below in Section 5.3, it can be optimal to have
24low types make ine¢ cient payments in labor, but it will never be optimal to have the highest type
do so.
The shirking constraint determines the degree to which labor can be used as a screening device
and therefore the form of payment of the low type:
Remark 2 As the utility cost of shirking (S) increases, the low type￿ s taxes will weakly shift towards
taxes in labor, i.e.,
@
￿
wL￿L
WL￿L+￿L
￿
@S ￿ 0, with the inequality strict whenever ECH does not bind and
￿L > 0.
Since an hour of the low type￿ s labor is publicly valued at the low type￿ s outside wage rate,
having the low type pay in labor does not a⁄ect the government budget constraint. It does, however,
allow for screening by a⁄ecting the high type￿ s hidden income constraint: it would now cost the
high type more in foregone income if he were to deviate to the low type￿ s tax package and pay labor
instead of money. As long as ECH is slack (in other words, as long as it is possible to increase
the tax payment of the high type without violating his IR constraint), then shifting the low type
toward labor will allow the planner to improve social welfare.
If the shirking constraint for the low type does bind (from Remark 1, we know that ￿ = 0 at
the optimum), then there are limits to the degree to which labor can be used as a screening device.
In this case, ￿L could be positive, and the inability to screen using labor could reduce the overall
progressivity of the tax system or make it no longer optimal to provide the public good. Note that
if instead the required labor was high skilled (could only be provided by the high type), there would
be no screening bene￿t from labor taxes. One implication is that such projects are less likely to
take place.
We next examine the distribution of payments:
Remark 3 As long as the planner has some information (either D > 0 or S > 0) and P >
u(wH) ￿ u
￿
wH ￿ G
N
￿
, then if the public good is provided, total payments will be strictly increasing
in household expenditure, i.e., it will always be the case that ￿H + wH￿H > ￿L + wL￿L:
Thus as long as the government has any information and su¢ cient ability to enforce, the tax
25system will be redistributive ￿i.e., the high type will pay more in taxes than the low type.33 This
result comes directly from the fact that the planner is maximizing social welfare and the marginal
utility of income is higher for the low type. The di⁄erence in tax payments between the two types
is weakly increasing in the wage gap between the two types.
The fact that the high type pays more does not necessarily imply that the tax system will be
progressive ￿i.e., it does not imply that the high type will pay more in taxes as a share of income
than the low type. In fact, whether the tax system is progressive or regressive is theoretically
ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the model.
It is also important to note that while the utility costs (P;D;S) represent a social loss, none
of these costs should be borne in equilibrium. E¢ ciency costs relative to the ￿rst best instead
take two forms. First, the public good may not be provided whereas it will always be provided in
the ￿rst best. This may occur if the government cannot satisfy the enforcement and information
constraints and still meet its budget constraint or if redistribution is limited enough that providing
the public good actually reduces social welfare. Second, in a multiple type case, it may be optimal
for the government to require ine¢ cient labor payments from individuals whose wage rate exceeds
the unskilled wage rate, since those labor payments serve as a screening device for higher wage
types. We discuss extensions to the multiple type case in more detail below.
5.1.3 Formal vs. informal taxes
We model formal and informal taxation as having di⁄erent technology triplets. Formal taxes
are thus represented by the triplet (PF;DF;SF) whereas informal taxes are represented by the
triplet (PI;DI;SI). We assume that PF ￿ PI ￿i.e., the punishments that can be imposed by the
courts, conditional on detecting non-compliance, are at least as great as the punishments that can
be imposed informally through social sanctions.34 By using the formal legal system, the social
33We monetize labor payments by the high type using the high type￿ s wage rate, since this measure is most relevant
for considering the distribution of tax burdens.
34Note that social sanctions must be levied by individual community members, not by the social planner directly.
However, we can think of the social planner as coordinating the community on a particular equilibrium by choosing
the schedule of social sanctions to be implemented by the community. If each individual in the community￿ s cost of
enforcing a social sanction on someone else is less than the cost of receiving a social sanction themselves, there is
an equilibrium where everyone in the community enforces the social sanction on non tax payers, as well as enforces
26planner can in theory levy an unlimited punishment if the individual does not meet his required
payments (for example, through imprisonment); in the informal tax system, there are likely to be
limits on the sanctions that can be imposed for non-payment. We can think of the costs of evading
income (D) or evading labor taxes (S) as inversely related to the information the community needs
to impose punishment. A conviction in the formal legal system is likely to require a higher level
of proof than a community needs to impose informal punishments, which implies that DF ￿ DI
and SF ￿ SI. The choice between formal and informal taxation thus entails a trade-o⁄ between
enforcement (P) and information (D and S).
Considering a limiting case may be useful for intuition. As PF ! 1 and DI ! 1, formal taxes
are limited by the IC constraints (hidden income and shirking) whereas informal taxes are limited by
IR constraints (punishments). Note that there are two potential sources of informational advantage
in the informal system: communities e⁄ectively have more information about true earnings ability
and they are better able to monitor labor payments. Either of these advantages is su¢ cient to
generate the result that informal taxation may be preferable to formal taxation; we believe both
are relevant in explaining the observed stylized facts, as we discuss below.
5.2 The informal tax framework and the stylized facts
5.2.1 The choice between formal and informal taxes
It is straightforward to see that loosening any of the constraints faced by the local government will
weakly allow it to achieve higher social welfare. This framework therefore suggests that informal
taxation is likely to result in a social welfare improvement relative to formal taxation when: (1) the
ability of the community to levy social sanctions (PI) is high; (2) there is more available information
about incomes informally than formally (DF < DI); and (3) the ability to monitor labor payments
informally is greater than the ability to monitor formally (SF < SI).
The prevalence of informal taxation throughout our sample of developing countries, particularly
the social sanction on anyone who deviates and does not enforce a social sanction when they are supposed to do so.
Perroni and Scharf (2007) note that any tax schedule must ultimately be sustained by the collective willingness of
the group to enforce the schedule, and Fehr and Gachter (2000) discuss the willingness of individuals to punish free
riders even if such punishments are costly.
27in rural areas, is consistent with the existing evidence that informal insurance and credit markets
may function more e⁄ectively in rural areas, where information is better and villagers are better
able to levy informal sanctions for default (Townsend 1995, Besley and Coate 1995, Banerjee and
Newman 1998, Ghatak 1999). The ability to verify income legally may also be more di¢ cult in
developing countries, since many individuals work in or can easily shift into the informal sector.35
Unsurprisingly, informal taxation mechanisms are not generally observed in developed countries,
where it is harder to hide income and where social sanctions may be less e⁄ective.36
Our model has considered the choice between formal and informal taxation made by a given
local government. Even within developing countries, information and social enforcement are likely
to be e⁄ective within small communities. This is consistent with the observation that informal
taxes tend to be levied at local levels, rather than by higher levels of government.
The framework also clari￿es why labor payments are more commonly observed in informal
taxation systems rather than in formal tax systems. Although labor payments are always desirable
as a screening device, they are also likely to be hard to verify legally. Therefore, the community
can more easily make use of labor payments as a screening device through the informal system.
Note that labor taxes are sometimes implemented through the formal tax schedule. Systems of
corvee labor, for example, were common at one time in Europe and elsewhere, and mandatory
labor taxes still exist in some countries, such as Vietnam. It may be that in at least some of these
contexts, local landlords or o¢ cials did not have to meet the burden of proof required by a court
in order to punish non-compliers, resulting in a high SF.37
5.2.2 The distribution and form of informal taxes
The informal tax model makes a number of predictions about the distribution and form of informal
tax payments. As discussed above, the framework suggests that informal tax payments should be
35Similarly, while landholding may be legally veri￿able in theory, land taxes in developing countries have also
proven di¢ cult to implement in practice (Burgess and Stern 1993).
36As noted in the introduction, however, such systems can arise even in countries like the United States in situations
in which formal taxation is limited.
37A number of studies have documented substantial absenteeism in sectors such as health and education in devel-
oping countries (e.g., Banerjee and Du￿ o 2006), which suggests that the e⁄ectiveness of formal public works projects
may be constrained by shirking as well.
28increasing with household expenditures. We ￿nd that the elasticity of total payment with respect to
household expenditure is positive in all countries (shown in Table 6), consistent with the prediction
of the model. Moreover, in the simple two-type case, it will be optimal for the public good to be
￿nanced solely by the high types if income inequality is su¢ ciently high and the planner has the
ability to satisfy the high type￿ s IR and hidden income IC constraints. The data is also consistent
with this prediction: we observe signi￿cantly positive participation gradients in the majority of
sample countries (Table 6).
In our simple framework, we have focused on the local government making a choice between
formal and informal taxes. In practice, the optimal solution may involve the government levying
both types of taxes. The observation that formal direct taxes are generally more progressive than
informal taxes could result from local governments levying formal taxes until D binds. While such
a formal tax system could be progressive, once D binds, a marginal expansion of the formal tax
system could then only be achieved by a (very regressive) poll tax. The local government might
instead choose to expand ￿nancing through informal taxes, where some degree of redistribution
can be achieved by making use of the higher information (D and S) available informally. The fact
that formal direct taxes tend to be very small (Figure 1) is consistent with the idea that local
governments are constrained in their ability to levy formal taxes, i.e., D may be binding.38
Our framework also rationalizes the prevalence of labor payments observed in the data. In the
￿rst best case, the government will be indi⁄erent between having the low type pay in labor versus
money. In our framework, the government will always prefer to have the low type pay in labor
if the shirking constraint does not bind, since doing so allows the government to extract greater
payments from those with (unobservably) higher income. If the shirking constraint does bind, the
low type may make payments in both money and labor, consistent with what we observe in the
data (Table 3, Panel B). Conversely, high types should pay in money rather than in labor, which
is what we observe in almost all countries (Table 8).
38By contrast, indirect formal taxes (VAT) are large, but these tend to be levied by state and national governments
and could be administratively di¢ cult to administer at the local level.
295.3 Extensions to multiple types
This section discusses two extensions of the model. First, we consider the case where the low
type￿ s wage is above the unskilled wage rate, so that having the low type pay in labor imposes
social costs. Second, we consider what happens when we introduce more than two types into the
model. Together, these two extensions allow the model to closely match all of the stylized facts
demonstrated above.
First, consider the case when both the high and low wages are above the unskilled wage rate.
Speci￿cally, suppose that a fraction ￿ of the population earns wage wH and a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ earns
wage wM, where wH > wM. The labor payments of each type are valued by the government at
wage rate wL; where wL < wM: The enforcement, hidden income and shirking constraints are the
same as above, with the di⁄erence that the low skilled type is now receiving wage wM and paying
taxes ￿MwM +￿M. In this case, the general pattern of the equilibrium ￿with the high type paying
more in total and the high type never paying labor taxes ￿still holds, i.e.:
Remark 4 Even if wM > wL, ￿H = 0 and ￿H > ￿M +wM￿M under conditions analogous to those
given in Remarks 1 and 3.
The key di⁄erence if wM > wL is that using labor as a screening device now has real social costs,
so it a⁄ects the attractiveness of using labor as a screening device. Nevertheless, we show with a
numerical example (provided in Appendix B) that it is still possible to obtain similar equilibria,
i.e.:
Remark 5 Even if wM > wL, it is still possible to obtain an equilibrium where the high type pays
only in money and the low type pays only in labor.
The model thus provides a potential explanation for labor payments made by those with an
opportunity cost above the unskilled wage rate, despite the fact that these in-kind payments are
ine¢ cient.
Second, we examine the case when there are three types in the model. With three types, we can
simultaneously consider participation gradients (i.e., does the household pay anything at all) and
30the quantity paid conditional on participating. With a numerical example (provided in Appendix
B) we can show the following possibility result:
Remark 6 If there are multiple types and if the cost of hiding income increases with the amount
of income hidden, it is possible to get both a positive participation gradient and a positive income
gradient conditional on participating.
The example in the appendix provides parameter values for which the pattern outlined in the
above remark will hold at the optimal solution. Moreover, in this numerical example, it is also be
optimal for the middle type, whose wage rate is greater than the unskilled wage rate, to pay in the
form of labor, since these payments serve as a screening device. We have thus provided an example
that encompasses many of the stylized facts: a positive participation gradient, a positive income
gradient conditional on paying, prevalent labor payments, a steeper gradient on money payments
than on labor payments, and labor payments by those whose incomes are greater than the unskilled
wage rate.
6 Alternative Explanations
In this section we discuss other explanations for these methods of local public goods ￿nance. In
particular, we focus on two alternatives: voluntary contributions and user fees. The ￿rst possi-
bility we consider is that observed informal tax payments are voluntary contributions, motivated
by altruism or warm glow preferences (e.g., Andreoni 1990). However, the inclusion of informal
taxes in Indonesian village budgets indicates that governments view these payments as a funda-
mental component of the local budget, rather than as charitable contributions which supplement
government expenditures. In addition, there is substantial evidence that these payments are not
purely voluntary. Many of the studies discussed in Section 2, for example, speci￿cally describe the
punishments that are imposed on those who do not meet their expected obligations.
To investigate more systematically the process through which informal tax payments are de-
termined and enforced, we asked both households and village heads in the Indonesia survey to
describe who makes decisions regarding household payments and what the consequences are for
31households who do not participate. The ￿rst question we asked was who makes decisions about
which households participate in such mechanisms (Table 9). Although respondents were allowed to
give multiple responses, only 8% of individual respondents and village heads reported that house-
holds make these decisions for themselves; 84% of households report that decisions are made by
neighborhood, hamlet, or village heads. We observe a similar pattern when respondents are asked
who makes decisions about how much each household is expected to pay: only 20% of households
and 15% of village heads report that households make these decisions for themselves. These consis-
tent responses from individual households and from village heads suggest that the these payments
are not voluntary contributions decided by individuals, but rather part of a system determined at
the community level.
We then ask respondents about the consequences for not making the determined level of pay-
ment. A substantial number of respondents indicated that they would be expected to make up the
contribution in another way, either by payment at a di⁄erent time or in a di⁄erent form. Most
strikingly, 17% of individual respondents and 21% of village heads indicated that non-participating
households would be expected to pay a ￿ne.39 Interestingly, we ￿nd that the probability that
a household reports a sanction for failure to pay is signi￿cantly higher for wealthier households;
this is consistent with poorer households not reporting sanctions because they are not expected to
make payments (results not reported in the table). Conditional on some type of sanction being
levied, 66% of households stated that the sanction was determined by either the village head or at
a village meeting. Taken together, these ￿ndings suggest informal tax payments are not analogous
to charitable contributions: informal tax payments are an important component of government
budgets, payment schedules are set by the leader or group, not by the individual, and there are
consequences imposed for non-payment.
A second alternative hypothesis is that these payments represent pre-paid user fees. A user fee
model would suggest that those who do not pay should be excluded from the public good; however,
virtually none of the individuals or village heads in the Indonesia sample described not being allowed
39It is worth noting that a smaller share of respondents and village heads report that they can replace their required
labor payment with the labor of another individual. If D is high enough that the government does not need labor
as a screening device, allowing replacement labor could be e¢ cient. Otherwise, allowing individuals to replace labor
undermines labor as a screening device.
32to use the result of the activity as a possible consequence of non-participation. In addition, a user
fee model would not necessarily generate a positive correlation between household expenditure and
payments, unless demand for the goods was correlated with household income. To examine this, we
examine whether households are more likely to pay for goods for which they bene￿t and whether
this could explain the observed positive participation gradient of informal tax payments. We focus
on the two types of goods for which we can clearly separate users from non-users: we examine
whether households who have their own private well are less likely to contribute to water projects,
and whether those with school-age children are more likely to contribute to schools.40
For countries for which we have disaggregated data on project type, we do see some mixed
evidence of user fees: in some countries, those who are likely to need public water are more likely
to pay for water projects and those with children are more likely to pay for schools (Table 10).41
However, with the exception of Zambia, we do not observe a positive expenditure gradient on
participation for schools or water projects, even in regressions where we do not control for having
children or not having access to private water. This suggests that while these goods may be
￿nanced partially through user fees, these goods are not explaining the overall positive correlation
we found above between participation rates and household expenditure. While these goods may
have a user fee components, other goods, such as roads, health centers, and sanitation systems,
may not.42
Another limitation of these alternative models is that they cannot, in isolation, fully explain the
observed pattern of labor payments. Each of these models predicts that households should make
payments in labor only if it is e¢ cient to do so. These models do not explain why labor payments
are so prevalent over a large range of the income distribution, nor do they explain why a given
40Note that the within-community sample sizes are not large enough for us to construct meaningful overlapping
samples. Therefore, the results for project type should be interpreted as illustrating the distribution of payments
for the sample of communities for which the share of households making payments to that project type are strictly
between zero and one.
41It is di¢ cult to interpret the coe¢ cient on children in the household since we also include equivalent scale
expenditure. We use this speci￿cation because we are primarily interested in the di⁄erence in the relationship
between payment and having children in the household across the school and water regressions rather in the level of
the coe¢ cient.
42Moreover, the point estiamtes on log expenditure per equivalent adult do not change substantially depending on
whether we include variables for having children in the household and having a private water source. This suggests
that even for these types of goods, di⁄erences in demand for the goods are not driving the participation gradient.
33household might make both labor and monetary payments. Explaining the patterns observed in
the data under these models therefore requires introducing failures in the labor market.
7 Conclusion
Informal taxation systems appear to play an important role in local public ￿nance in developing
countries. We present some of the ￿rst systematic, cross-country evidence on the prevalence,
magnitude, distributional implications, and forms of informal taxation. We ￿nd that informal
taxation is prevalent, with 20% or more of households participating in informal taxation schemes
in all but one surveyed country, and more than 50% of households participating in several countries.
Informal taxes exceed formal direct tax payments by most households and can form a substantial
share of households￿total tax burdens. In Indonesia, where we can compare informal taxes to local
budgets, we ￿nd that informal taxation represents the largest source of public ￿nance under local
control and comprises a substantial share of all development expenditures.
We propose a simple optimal tax framework that helps to explain many of the stylized facts
about informal taxation we observe in the data. We depart from the ￿rst best case by introducing
constraints on enforcement (the government may face limits in enforcing its tax schedule) and
constraints on information (individuals can hide income and shirk when working on public labor
projects). The choice between formal and informal taxation represents a trade-o⁄between the two
types of constraints. The model parsimoniously explains the patterns of informal tax prevalence,
the positive income gradient on informal tax payments, and the widespread use of labor payments,
even when such payments appear to be ine¢ cient. While there may be other stories that could
explain subsets of these facts, our model reconciles all of the observed facts in a single framework
that requires relatively few assumptions.
Our ￿ndings have a number of implications for thinking about public ￿nance in developing
countries and for development policy. First, a substantial share of households in many developing
countries participate in extragovernmental mechanisms for the ￿nance of local public goods. Policies
such as the imposition of formal taxes, paid public works programs, and intergovernmental grants
34may therefore a⁄ect households and communities both directly as well as indirectly, through their
e⁄ects on informal taxation mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this type of crowd-out has
not traditionally been considered in the analysis of public programs in developing countries.
Second, to the extent that these payments are thought of as a tax, estimates of formal taxes
may understate the true tax burden faced by households. In particular, the conventional wisdom
that poor households and households in rural areas do not generally pay taxes other than VAT may
be misleading. The potential e¢ ciency costs of these taxes have not, to the best of our knowledge,
been considered; in our framework, e¢ ciency costs arise from possible failure to provide the public
good and ine¢ cient payments in labor.
Third, failing to take informal taxation into account will lead to underestimates of the size
of the public sector and the level of decentralization. In particular, informal taxation can be
the dominant source of revenue for local communities and may be a non-trivial component of
national spending on public capital improvements in developing countries. While there has been
an increasing push toward decentralization in developing countries, such reforms have generally
led to greater decentralization of expenditures than of revenue collection (Bardhan 2002). Since
informal taxes are collected at the community level, these ￿ndings indicate that a larger share of
local public goods is ￿nanced locally than the formal budget ￿gures would suggest. In addition,
informal taxation generally pays for particular types of goods, so formal tax ￿gures will distort
estimates of the mix as well as the level of government expenditures.
Finally, informal taxation is redistributive but regressive, and this pattern is observed in all of
our sample countries. Formal taxes appear to be more progressive than informal taxes, so failing
to take informal taxation into account will result in overestimates of the overall progressivity of the
tax system. The ￿ndings also suggest that a marginal expansion of the formal tax system through
expansion of the VAT, used to allow communities to reduce informal taxes, could substantially
increase the overall progressivity of the tax system. However, it is important to keep in mind that
most of these formal taxes are not raised by the local community, and determining the appropriate
community-speci￿c intergovernmental transfers is challenging. This is a primary reason why local
public goods in developed countries are often ￿nanced through local taxation.
35The ￿ndings also have important implications for development policy. Many government pro-
grams, such as community-driven development programs championed by the World Bank and oth-
ers, encourage local co-￿nancing of public goods. Given that ￿nancing through informal taxation
is more regressive than ￿nancing through the overall tax system, there would need to be other
bene￿ts of local co-￿nancing to make this co-￿nancing optimal. For example, requiring local co-
￿nancing might help reveal information about the local willingness to pay for local public goods, or
it could improve project sustainability by encouraging ongoing maintenance of local public goods.
Alternatively, as discussed above, it is possible that additional central ￿nancing of public goods
might crowd out these types of locally-￿nanced public goods, altering both the level and type of
public goods provided. There could also be other consequences of formal versus informal ￿nancing
on community institutions and social networks. Understanding how central government policies
interact with informal taxation is an important direction for future research.
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39Figure 1: Comparison of formal and informal taxes 
   
 
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
%
 
o
f
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
10 11 12 13 14
Log equivalent expenditure
Informal taxes Total formal taxes
Direct formal taxes Density
Albania
0
2
4
6
%
 
o
f
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
2 3 4 5 6
Log equivalent expenditure
Informal taxes Total formal taxes
Direct formal taxes Density
Ethiopia
0
2
4
6
%
 
o
f
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
11 12 13 14 15
Log equivalent expenditure
Informal taxes Total formal taxes
Direct formal taxes Density
Indonesia 2007
0
1
2
3
%
 
o
f
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5
Log equivalent expenditure
Informal taxes Total formal taxes
Direct formal taxes Density
Philippines
0
1
2
3
4
5
%
 
o
f
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
5 6 7 8
Log equivalent expenditure
Informal taxes Total formal taxes
Direct formal taxes Density
Vietnam 2002
 
Notes: Tax variables are plotted as non-parametric Fan regressions of each variable against log equivalent household expenditure. These regressions do not include community 
fixed effects. For comparison, we also plot a histogram of log equivalent household expenditure. To keep the graphs readable, we exclude the bottom 0.5% and top 0.5% of the 
household expenditure distribution. 
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Table 1: Data sources 
   Database Name  Year  Sample 
Sample size 
(number of 
households)
Recall 
period 
Labor  Money 
Payment 
indicator Quantity   
Payment 
indicator Quantity 
Albania  Living standards measurement survey  2005 Nationally representative  3,840  1 year X X     
Ethiopia  Ethiopian rural household survey  1997 Only rural areas  1,482  1 year X X     
Guatemala National survey of living conditions  2000 Nationally representative  7,276  1 year X      
Indonesia  Health and education service survey  2007 Only rural areas, focus on poorer areas  11,676  1 year X X  X X 
Nicaragua  Living standards measurement study survey 1998 Nationally representative  4,209  5 years  X    X   
Nigeria  Nigeria living standards survey  2004 Nationally representative  19,159  1 year  X       
Panama  Living standards survey  2003 Nationally representative  6,363  1 year  X    X   
Philippines Living condition Survey  2003 Only rural areas, focus on poorer areas  2,398  6 months  X  X     
Vietnam  Household living standards survey  2002 Nationally representative  29,426  1 year  X  X  X  X 
Zambia  Living condition monitoring survey  1998 Nationally representative  16,788  5 years  X       X    
Notes: For more details on each of the surveys, please see Appendix A.. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 Albania  Ethiopia  Guatemala Indonesia  Nicaragua Nigeria  Panama  Philippines Vietnam  Zambia 
Household size  4.4 7.3 5.2 3.8 5.5 4.8 4.0 5.1 4.4 5.4 
Number of workers per household  1.6 1.6 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.4  1.9 2.5 1.9 
Expenditure per capita (in PPP $)  3396 554 2338  1112  2850 489 3514 938 1368 744 
GDP per capita (in 2000 PPP$)  4731 814 4048  3423  2910 941 6129  4250 2274  774 
% urban  47 0 43 0 57  45  64 0 24  36 
Age  (Household  head)  52 47 44 47 45 48 48  47 48 41 
Years of education (Household head)  9.6  2.5  4.1  6.5  4.3 5.1 8.3  5.7 7.0 6.6 
Notes: Each cell presents the mean of the variable in the row in the dataset listed in the column. When GDP is not available for the survey year, we used the most 
recent data. 
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Table 3: Summary of informal tax payments 
        
Philippines Albania Ethiopia Guatemala Indonesia Panama    Nigeria Vietnam Nicaragua Zambia 
Recall 
Period     6 months  1 year  1 year  1 year  1 year  1 year  1 year  1 year  5 years  5 years 
Panel A  Any 
payment 
All 0.33  0.09  0.51  0.37  0.76  0.32  0.26  0.59  0.20  0.23 
Rural 0.33  0.12  0.51  0.51  0.76 0.48  0.32  0.62 0.26 0.27 
Urban  0.07  0.18  0.24 0.20 0.49  0.16  0.15 
                                
Panel B 
Any 
labor 
payment 
All 0.33  0.09  0.51  0.37  0.76  0.19  0.26  0.24  0.15  0.18 
Rural 0.33  0.12  0.51  0.51  0.76 0.34  0.32  0.28 0.22 0.23 
Urban  0.07  0.18  0.11 0.20 0.13  0.09  0.08 
Any 
money 
payment 
All  0.28 0.22  0.50 0.08 0.08 
Rural  0.28 0.30  0.51 0.07 0.07 
Urban  0.18  0.45 0.08 0.09 
Both 
money 
and labor 
payments 
All  0.27 0.09  0.15 0.02 0.03 
Rural 
Urban                               
Notes:  Each cell presents the mean of the variable listed in the row in the dataset listed in the column. Some surveys only contained information 
about labor payments; for these surveys, participation rates given in Panel A will be identical to participation rates for “any labor payment” given in 
Panel B. 43 
 
Table 3: Summary of informal tax payments (continued) 
        
Philippines Albania Ethiopia Guatemala Indonesia Panama    Nigeria Vietnam Nicaragua Zambia 
Panel 
C 
Amount of 
labor 
payment 
(in days) 
All 
1.1   0.2   14.1      5.7         3.1        
(4.2) (0.6)  (28.3)  (13.2)  (7.3) 
Rural 
1.1   0.2   14.1   5.7   3.5  
(4.2) (0.6)  (28.3)  (13.2)  (7.7) 
Urban 
0.1   1.6  
(0.6)  (5.6) 
Conditional 
amount of 
labor 
payment 
(in days) 
All 
3.3   1.8   27.6   7.5   12.8  
(6.8) (1.2)  (34.6)  (14.7)  (9.8) 
Rural 
3.3   1.6   27.6   7.5   12.8  
(6.8) (1.0)  (34.6)  (14.7)  (9.7) 
Urban 
2.1   12.9  
(1.3)  (10.1) 
Amount of 
money 
payment 
(in 2000 
PPP US$) 
All 
8.9   13.5  
(167.4)  (19.8) 
Rural 
8.9   13.2  
(167.4)  (18.4) 
Urban 
14.5  
(23.6) 
Conditional 
amount of 
money 
payment 
(in 2000 
PPP US$) 
All 
32.5   27.2  
(318.2)  (20.4) 
Rural 
32.5   25.8  
(318.2)  (18.3) 
Urban 
32.0  
                     (25.8)       
Notes: For reference in interpreting the monetary amounts in Panel C, the average annual per capita expenditure in these samples (in PPP$) is 1112 for 
Indonesia and 1368 for Vietnam.  Conditional amounts reported are conditional on making any payment. 44 
 
Table 4: Informal Taxation, Expenditure, and Formal Taxation 
   Philippines Albania Ethiopia Indonesia    Vietnam 
Informal tax as a share of HH expenditure 
All households  0.0023  0.0004  0.0377  0.0143  0.0085 
Conditional on informal tax > 0  0.0066 0.0037  0.0681  0.0183 0.0141 
Informal tax as a share of HH Total Formal + Informal Tax payments 
All households  0.0694  0.0048  0.268  0.1656  0.1570 
Conditional on informal tax > 0  0.2036 0.0457  0.4922  0.2115 0.2607 
Notes: The included countries are the countries for which we have quantity data on informal tax payments. 
Please see Appendix A for details on the formal tax payment calculations. 
 
Table 5: Comparison to other local budgets in Indonesia 
Per household value of:  Mean  Informal taxes as percent of…. 
From Indonesia household survey:    
Informal taxes  49.86  . 
Direct formal taxes  29.16              171% 
Indirect formal taxes  158.88                31% 
    
From village budget data:    
Total annual village budget:  43.67              114% 
Total village development expenses:  23.87              209% 
Total village routine expenses:  15.29              326% 
    
Village revenue from inter-governmental transfers:  19.48              256% 
Village revenue from local formal taxes/fees:  4.25            1173% 
Village revenue from on-books informal taxation  13.09              381% 
Village revenue from other sources:   6.86              727% 
    
From district budget data:    
Total annual district budget  696.65                  7% 
Total district development expenses:  231.85                22% 
Total district routine expenses:  464.80                11% 
   
District revenue from inter-governmental transfers and other sources:  721.66                  7% 
District revenue from local formal taxes/fees:  17.50              285% 
District revenue from other sources:  28.49              175% 
Notes: All data comes from Indonesia. Village and district budgets are from 2001, and are inflated to 2007 Rupiah using the Indonesian CPI. Village budget data 
are from the 2003 Census of Villages; District budget data are from the World Bank. All are the per-household amounts for the 19 districts where we have 
complete data from the household survey, the village budget data, and the district budget data. All amounts are reported in 2000 PPP US$, as in the previous 
tables, which translates to US$1 = Rp. 3571. Note that districts have small budget surpluses in 2001; this was the first year of decentralization, so districts likely 
were still adjusting to their new roles.  45 
 
 
Table 6: Informal taxation vs. household expenditure 
   Philippines  Albania  Ethiopia  Guatemala  Indonesia   Panama  Nigeria   Vietnam   Nicaragua  Zambia 
Panel A:Participation margin, with community fixed effects  (conditional logit model) 
Any 
payment 
-0.018 0.456***  0.159 0.160 0.196**  0.427***  0.107*  0.439***  -0.094 0.111*** 
(0.117) (0.097) (0.159) (0.100) (0.087) (0.065) (0.056) (0.060) (0.122) (0.042) 
Observations       2200         2487        1165        5074         6188         5963         9036        24521         2669        10271 
 
Panel B: Total payments, with community fixed effects (Poisson model) 
Total 
payments 
0.395*  0.334***  0.127***   0.387***      0.080***    
(0.213)  (0.053)  (0.054)   (0.041)      (0.025)    
Observations       2143        1784        1062        10840           26899     
 
Panel C: Total payments, with community fixed effects, conditional on payments > 0 (Poisson model) 
Total 
payments 
0.229* 0.122***  0.111**   0.364***      0.001     
(0.117)  (0.043)  (0.049)   (0.041)     (0.021)     
Observations        655         254         587          9053           17310     
Notes: Each cell reports the estimates from a separate regression, with robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Panel A reports 
results from conditional logit estimates, where the dependent variable is a dummy for making any informal tax payments, the independent variable is log 
household expenditure per equivalent adult, and the conditioning variable is the village. Panel B reports results from conditional Poisson QMLE models, 
where the dependent variable is the quantity of informal tax payments (where labor payments are converted to monetary units at the household’s predicted 
wage rate), the independent variable is log household expenditure per equivalent adult, and the conditioning variable is the village. Panel C reports results 
from an analogous model to Panel B but without conditioning on the household having made a positive informal tax payment. 46 
 
 
Table 7: Formal taxes vs. household expenditure: quantities 
     Philippines Albania  Ethiopia  Indonesia    Vietnam 
 
Panel A: Informal taxes, with community fixed effects 
Total payments  0.395* 0.334***  0.127***  0.387***  0.080*** 
(0.213) (0.053)  (0.054) (0.041)  (0.025) 
Observations        2143        1784        1062      10840       26899 
 
Panel B: Direct formal taxes, with community fixed effects 
Total payments  1.526*** 1.433***  0.418*** 1.372***  0.691*** 
  (0.198)  (0.083)  (0.134)  (0.075)  (0.114) 
Observations       2073        3358        1197       11591       20407 
 
Panel C: Total (direct + indirect) formal taxes, with community fixed effects 
Total payments  0.901*** 1.009***  0.798*** 1.102***  1.289*** 
(0.104) (0.006)  (0.056) (0.022)  (0.038) 
Observations       2259       3838       1197       11674       29422 
         
Notes: Each cell reports the estimates from a separate regression, with robust standard errors clustered at the village 
level in parentheses. All results are from conditional Poisson QMLE models, where the dependent variable is given in 
the table, the independent variable is log household expenditure per equivalent adult, and the conditioning variable is 
the village. 47 
 
 
Table 8: Labor and money payments 
   Indonesia   Panama  Vietnam   Nicaragua  Zambia 
       
Panel A: Participation margin 
Labor 
payment 
0.190** 0.137  0.003  -0.099  0.065 
(0.085) (0.090) (0.093) (0.130) (0.044) 
Observations       6433       5782      14753       2225       8902 
       
Money 
payment 
0.720*** 0.634*** 0.560***  -0.057  0.167*** 
(0.077) (0.067) (0.059) (0.150) (0.059) 
Observations      7313       5716       23780       1405       6701 
 
Panel B: Quantities 
Labor 
payment 
0.260***   -0.018     
(0.039)   (0.036)    
Observations     10840        15826     
         
Money 
payment 
1.446***   0.220***    
(0.208)   (0.026)    
Observations       7632         25429     
Notes: See Notes to Table 6. All specifications include community fixed effects. 
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Table 9: Decisions about informal tax payments 
  Respondent 
 Individual  Village  Head 
1. Who makes decisions about which households participate?    
Village/hamlet/neighborhood head  84.2  79.0 
Village/hamlet/neighborhood meeting  49.5  54.6 
Each household decides for themselves  8.0  8.1 
    
2. Who determines how much is expected from each household?    
Village/hamlet/neighborhood head  69.1  56.0 
Village/hamlet/neighborhood meeting  51.1  60.1 
Each household decides for themselves  20.4  14.7 
    
3. What is the sanction imposed on a household if they do not 
participate?    
Replace at another time  10.6  12.7 
Give materials/food  11.1  19.5 
Replace with other person  5.2  9.0 
Pay another person to replace you  2.0  5.6 
Pay a fine  17.0  20.8 
Not allowed to use result of activity  0.1  0.7 
Excluded from local activities  0.4  1.2 
No specified sanction   62.3  53.3 
    
4. If applicable, who determines this sanction?    
Village/hamlet/neighborhood head  66.3  36.0 
Village/hamlet/neighborhood meeting  66.7  61.7 
Each household decides for themselves  22.3  21.0 
Notes: All data comes from Indonesia.  Multiple responses were allowed for each question. The full set of 
choices given for questions 1, 2, and 4 were: village head, hamlet head, neighborhood head, village 
meeting, hamlet meeting, neighborhood meeting, each household decides for themselves, religious 
leaders, other informal leaders, and other. For question 4, the choice of no sanction / not applicable was 
also given. The full set of choices given for question 3 was: replace at another time, give materials/food, 
replace with another person, pay another person to replace you, pay a fine, not allowed to use result of 
activity, excluded from local activities, other, and no official sanction. 
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Table 10: User fees 
      Indonesia     Nicaragua     Nigeria     Panama     Zambia     Philippines 
Panel A: School Contributions             
           
Children in the HH  0.476**    0.617***    0.172    2.106***    0.827***    1.094*   
(0.199)    (0.173)    (0.113)    (0.228)    (0.112)    (0.626)   
-0.121 
 
0.186 
  
-0.37 
 
0.464* 
 
-0.204 
 
No private water 
(0.346)    (0.263)     (0.359)    (0.248)    (0.538)   
0.351 0.307 
 
-0.09 -0.137 
 
0.0246 -0.0107 
 
-0.204** -0.459*** 
 
0.130*** 0.0786* 
 
0.362 0.284  Log expenditure per 
equivalent adult  (0.234)  (0.248    (0.122) (0.115)    (0.098) (0.096)   (0.102) (0.095)    (0.049) (0.047)    (0.362) (0.394) 
1308 1308 
 
1743 1743 
 
2860 2860 
 
4767 4767 
 
8389 8389 
 
384 384  Observations 
           
           
Panel B: Water Contributions             
0.322** 
 
0.436 
  
0.365*** 
 
0.183 
 
-1.077 
 
Children in the HH 
(0.152)    (0.393)     (0.112)    (0.167)    (1.145)   
0.112 
 
3.382*** 
  
1.190* 
 
1.438*** 
 
-0.653 
 
No private water 
(0.239)    (0.484)     (0.623)    (0.375)    (1.032)   
0.248 0.192 
 
-0.167 -0.088 
  
0.048 0.004 
 
0.132 0.146* 
 
-0.191 -0.170  Log expenditure per 
equivalent adult  (0.168)  (0.165    (0.258) (0.221)     (0.135) (0.133)    (0.089) (0.082)    (2.030) (1.817) 
1397 1398 
 
1076 1076 
  
3282 3282 
 
4096 4096 
 
102 102  Observations 
Notes: Each column reports results from conditional logit regressions, as in Panel A of Table 6, except that the dependent variable is restricted to participation in payments for 
schools (Panel A) or participation in payments for water systems (Panel B). The first column for each country includes a dummy variable for missing water source.  
Households were defined as beneficiaries of public water if their listed primary source of drinking water was publicly provided, man-made, and more complex than a simple 
dug well. Natural sources (river, spring, rain, etc.), public or private dug wells, and other private water sources (piped water, tube wells, etc.) are not counted. Sources such as 
shared tube/piped wells and community water systems (publicly provided piped water, etc.) are included.  Households were defined as beneficiaries of schools if they had at 
least one member of school age (defined as between ages 4 and 14 years). 